ABSTRACT Identity-based cryptosystems mean that public keys can be directly derived from user identifiers, such as telephone numbers, email addresses, and social insurance number, and so on. So they can simplify key management procedures of certificate-based public key infrastructures and can be used to realize authentication in blockchain. Linearly homomorphic signature schemes allow to perform linear computations on authenticated data. And the correctness of the computation can be publicly verified. Although a series of homomorphic signature schemes have been designed recently, there are few homomorphic signature schemes designed in identity-based cryptography. In this paper, we construct a new ID-based linear homomorphic signature scheme, which avoids the shortcomings of the use of public-key certificates. The scheme is proved secure against existential forgery on adaptively chosen message and ID attack under the random oracle model. The ID-based linearly homomorphic signature schemes can be applied in e-business and cloud computing. Finally, we show how to apply it to realize authentication in blockchain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, people have paid attention to the importance of information security [3] - [6] , [9] , [10] . The public-key cryptography plays a critical role in information security. As we know, certificate-based cryptosystems are most widely deployed public-key cryptosystems. And they require that the authenticated public-key certificate of an entity be obtained in order to encrypt information for the entity. So these certificates need to be generated in large and distributed to many users in communities. Furthermore, the certificates need to be verified frequently. So the management of public-key certificates is cumbersome. In order to avoid the shortcomings of the use of public-key certificates, Shamir introduced the concept of identity-based cryptography in 1984 [1] . The idea is to derive public keys directly from user identifiers, such as telephone numbers, email addresses, and social insurance number etc.. Moreover, the corresponding private key is generated by a combination of the user's public key and the systemlevel secret key of a central authority that is named as Private Key Generator or PKG for short. Since then, the research on ID-based cryptography has made great progress, such as ID-based signature schemes [11] , [28] , [29] , ID-based encryption schemes [30] , [31] , ID-based key agreement schemes [32] , [33] .
In 2002, the conception of homomorphic signature was originally proposed by Johnson et al. [2] . The notion of homomorphic signature is an important primitive and allows to validate computation over authenticated data [39] - [41] . Informally, a user Alice can sign l messages {m i } l i=1 and produce the signatures {σ i } l i=1 , which can be verified exactly as ordinary signatures. The homomorphic property provides the special feature that given σ 1 , . . . , σ l and some function f : M l → M , anyone can compute a signature σ on the value f (m 1 , . . . , m l ) without knowl-edge of the secret signing key Sk. Homomorphic signature schemes can be employed in electronic business and cloud computing [16] , [18] , [21] , [27] , [36] . Nowadays, there are many types of homomorphic signatures, such as the linearly homomorphic signature schemes [7] , [8] , [13] , [20] , [23] , [26] , the homomorphic schemes supporting polynomial functions [12] , [14] , [15] , and the leveled fully homomorphic signature schemes [17] , [19] . But these schemes belong to certificate-based cryptosystems. Up to our knowledge, there are few homomorphic signature schemes [34] , [35] , [37] designed in identity-based cryptography. And the schemes in [34] and [35] focus on network coding which can prevent malicious nodes to produce the pollution attacks. The scheme in [37] is designed over lattices, and it is not efficient. Since the management of public-key certificates is cumbersome in the certificate-based cryptosystems, it is meaningful to design homomorphic signature schemes in identity-based cryptosystems.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, the concept and security model of ID-based linearly homomorphic signature are proposed. It means that the signer can produce a linearly homomorphic signature in identity-based cryptosystems. Moreover, we use bilinear groups as the underlying tool to design an ID-based linearly homomorphic signature. The new scheme is proved secure against existential forgery on adaptively chosen message and ID attack in the random oracle model, and it can combine the natures of linearly homomorphic signature and identity-based cryptosystems.
B. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries about bilinear maps, the short signature scheme proposed by Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham (BLS), as well as the framework of ID-based linear homomorphic signature schemes and the security model. Section 3 gives a new ID-based linear homomorphic signature, and Section 4 gives the security proof of the scheme. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR GROUPS
In this section, we briefly review the facts about bilinear maps. Let (G 1 ,G 2 ) be two cyclic groups of prime order q, in which group operations are efficiently computable.
e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear map with the following properties:
ab ; (2) Non-degenerate: There exist g, h ∈ G 1 , such that e(g, h) = 1; (3) Computable: For all g, h ∈ G 1 , there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(g, h). Now we introduce the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in G 1 .
Definition 1: (CDH). Let g ∈ G 1 be a random generator, x, y ← Z q * be taken over the uniform choices, and λ be the security parameter. We define the advantage of an adversary A in solving the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem as
where the probability is taken over the uniform choices of x, y and the internal coin tosses of A. If for every probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A, the ADV cdh A (λ) is negligible, we say that the CDH assumption holds in G 1 .
B. BLS SHORT SIGNATURE SCHEME
The BLS short signature scheme proposed in [22] consists of the following algorithms: a key generation algorithm KeyGen, a signature generation algorithm Sign and a signature verification algorithm Verify. And it uses a full-domain hash function H : {0, 1} * → G 1 . e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear map, and g is a random generator of G 1 . KeyGen: Pick a random x ∈ Z * q as the secret key, and computer the public key PK = g x . Sign: Given a secret key x, and a message m, this algorithm outputs the signature σ = H (m)
x . Verify: Given a public key PK , a message m, and a signature σ , if the equation e(g, σ ) = e(PK , H (m)) holds, this algorithm outputs 1; otherwise it outputs 0.
The security of BLS short signature scheme is based on the CDH assumption. We refer to [22] for more details.
C. ID-BASED SIGNATURE SCHEME Definition 2 (ID-Based Signature Scheme [11] ): An ID-based signature scheme is a tuple of four PPT algorithms (Setup, Extract, Sign, Verify). The algorithms are defined as follows:
• Setup: This algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a secret/public key pair (x, P pub ) for the PKG.
• Extract: This algorithm takes as input the secret key x, the params and an user's identity ID, and returns a private key D ID corresponding to ID in the system.
• Sign: Given the private key D ID and a message m, this algorithm outputs a signature σ for m.
• Verify: Given the signer's identity ID, a message m and a signature σ , this algorithm outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature for m; otherwise, output 0.
Existential Unforgeability. An ID-based signature scheme is unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message and ID attacks if no polynomial time algorithm A has a nonnegligible advantage against a challenger C in the following game:
• C runs Setup of the scheme and sends the system parameters to A.
• A issues the following queries:
(1) Extract queries. Given an identity ID, C outputs the private key corresponding to ID. VOLUME 6, 2018 (2) Signing queries. Given an identity ID and a message m, C returns a signature for m.
• A outputs (ID * , m, σ • HSetup: This algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ, an upper bound l for the number of messages signed in each file and an integer N denoting the length of vectors to be signed. It outputs a secret/public key pair (x, P pub ) for the PKG.
• HExtract: This algorithm takes as input the secret key for the PKG, the params and an user's identity ID, and returns a secret key D ID corresponding to ID in the system.
• HSign: Given the secret key D ID , a message vector v, and a file identifier τ , this algorithm outputs a signature σ .
• HVerify: Given the signer's identity ID, a message vector v, a file identifier τ , and a signature σ , this algorithm outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature for v; otherwise, output 0.
• HEval: Given the signer's identity ID, a file identifier τ , and a set of tuples {(f i , σ i )} l i=1 , this algorithm outputs a signature σ (Note that σ is intended to be a signature on (1) , v (2) , . . . , v (l) ). Correctness. For correctness, we require: (1) For all message vector v and all file identifier τ ∈{0,
λ and all sets of triples {(
Security model:
An ID-based linear homomorphic signature is unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message and ID attack if the advantage of any PPT adversary A in the following game is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Setup: The challenger C sets a secret/public key pair (x, P pub ) for the PKG, and gives P pub to the adversary A.
Queries: The adversary's attack capabilities are modelled by providing it access to a series of oracles, so A can ask a polynomial number of queries as follows:
• HExtract queries. Given an identity ID, C outputs the secret key corresponding to ID.
• HSigning queries. A asks for a new signature on an identity ID, a message vector v and a file identifier τ ∈{0, 1} λ . The challenger C runs the algorithm HSign to compute a signature σ for v. Finally C chooses a handle h from a proper set, stores (h, (σ, ID, v, τ )) in a table T and returns h to A.
• Derivation queries. A chooses a set of handles h = (h 1 , . . . , h l ) and a vector of coefficients f = (f 1 , . . . , f l ). Then the challenger C checks
..,l from table T and returns ⊥ if any of these does not exist or if τ i = τ j for some The adversary wins if Hverify(ID * , v * , τ * , Q * ) = 1, the identity ID * does not appear in HExtract queries, and it must satisfy one of the following conditions:
1) The file identifier τ * = τ k for all τ k that appears in the table T * and v * = 0. 2) The file identifier τ * = τ k for some file identifier τ k that appears in the table T * , but v * ∈ V k , where V k denotes the subspace spanned by all vectors
..,l k queried with the same file τ k that appears in T * , with 0 < l k ≤ l. We define the advantage ADV lhs A (λ) of an adversary against an ID-based linearly homomorphic signature scheme as the probability of A winning the above game.
Definition 4: (Unforgeability of ID-based Linearly Homomorphic Signatures
). An ID-based linearly homomorphic signature scheme is secure against chosen-message and ID attack if ADV lhs A (λ) in the above relevant game is negligible for any PPT adversaries.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we propose a provably secure ID-based linearly homomorphic signature from bilinear pairings. The new scheme is defined as follows: 1) HSetup: Let (G 1 ,G 2 ) be bilinear groups such that |G 1 |=|G 2 |=q for some prime number q. A bilinear map is given by e:
and H 2 will be viewed as random oracles in our security proof. Choose a generator g of G 1 and x ∈ Z * q , then set
The security parameter is λ. S=(Setup,Extract,Sign,Verify) is a standard ID-based signature scheme, such as the scheme proposed in [11] . Compute (x s , P pub s ) ← Setup(1 λ ) as the secret/public key of PKG for S. The master secret key is x h = (x s , x), and the master public key is P pub h = (G 1 , G 2 , q, g, P pub s , P pub , e, H 1 , H 2 ). 2) HExtract: Given an identity ID, the algorithm generates D
(1)
ID ), which is the secret key associated to the identity ID. 3) Hsign: Suppose this algorithm has stored a list L of all previously returned identifiers τ with the related information (r, w, σ 1 ) defined below. Take the secret key D ID , an identity ID, a message vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v N ) ∈ Z N q and a file identifier τ ∈{0, 1} λ as input, this algorithm responses according to the type of τ in input:
• If τ appears in L, retrieve the associated (r, w, σ 1 ) from L.
• Otherwise, choose r ∈ Z * q randomly, set w ← g r ,
ID , (τ, w)), and store this information in L. Then choose s ∈ Z * q randomly, and compute
Finally, output Q ← (w, σ 1 , σ 2 , s) as a signature for a message vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v N ). 4) HVerify: Given an identity ID, a file identifier τ , a message vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v N ) ∈ Z N q and a signature Q = (w, σ 1 , σ 2 , s), the verifier checks that:
If both of the above equations hold, output 1; otherwise, output 0. 5) HEval: Given an identity ID, a file identifier τ , and a set of tuples
Correctness:
Given an identity ID, a file identifier τ , a message vector ID, v, τ ) , the correctness of the scheme can be verified by the following equations:
Moreover, given τ ∈{0, 1} λ and all sets of triples
, where w (1) = w (2) = ... = w (l) , by our definition of HEval, we have
Then the signature is Q = (w (1) , σ
1 , σ 2 , s). Now, we only need to check that Q is a signature on
, by correctness of individual signature, we have
(1) )) = 1,
So by the bilinear property, we have
Both of the verification equations hold, so Q is a signature on the v = i∈ [l] f i v (i) .
This completes the proofs.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME ANALYSIS
Theorem 1: Assuming S=(Setup,Extract,Sign,Verify) is an ID-based signature scheme unforgeable under adaptive chosen message and ID attack, H 1 and H 2 are viewed as random oracles, and the CDH assumption holds, the scheme described above is an ID-based linear homomorphic signature scheme secure against chosen-message and ID attack.
Proof: As usual, the proof proceeds by contradiction. Assuming there exists an adversary A that has nonnegligible probability in winning the above game, we will show how to build a simulator B that breaks the security of the underlying ID-based signature scheme S or the CDH assumption. Let (ID * , v * , τ * , Q * = (w * , σ * 1 , σ * 2 , s * )) be a valid forgery returned by the adversary. It must hold that Hverify(ID * , v * , τ * , Q * ) = 1 and the identity ID * does not appear in HExtract queries. According to the game definition, we distinguish two types of forgery as follows:
• Type 1: File identifier τ * = τ j for all τ j that appears in any Reveal queries and v * = 0.
• Type 2: τ * = τ j for some file identifier τ j that appears in any Reveal queries, but v * ∈ V j , where V j denotes the subspace spanned by all vectors {v i } i=1,...,l j queried with the same file τ j in the Reveal queries, with 0 < l j ≤ l.
First, the simulator flips a coin b ← {0, 1} randomly. If b = 0, it guesses that the adversary will produce a Type 1 forgery. Otherwise, it guesses that the adversary will return a Type 2 forgery. Notice that with probability at least 1 2 the guess is correct.
A. TYPE 1 SIMULATION
Assuming B is a simulator, A is an adversary for our scheme, and C s is a challenger for the underlying ID-based signature scheme S. In this case, B has guessed that A will return a Type 1 forgery. We describe B that uses A to break the security of S. First, B receives P pub s from C s , sets x ← Z * q , P pub ← g x , and initializes an empty table L as described in the description of the above scheme. Then B sends the master public key (G 1 , G 2 , q, g, P pub s , P pub , e, H 1 , H 2 ) to A.
HExtract queries. When A requests the secret key for user ID, B uses its Extracting oracle for S to get D ID ) and sends D ID to A. HSigning queries. When A asks for a new signature on an identity ID, a message vector v and a file identifier τ , B checks if τ does not appear in L, then chooses r ∈ Z * q randomly, sets w ← g r , uses its Signing oracle for S to compute σ 1 for (τ, w), and stores (r, w, σ 1 ) in L. Otherwise, it retrieves the associated (r, w, σ 1 ) from L. Then B can easily compute (σ 2 , s) (i.e. the remaining parts of each signature) as in the real case. And B sets Q ← (w, σ 1 , σ 2 , s). Note that Q is associated with a new handle h and B stores (h, (Q, ID, v, τ )) in a table T .
Derivation and Reveal queries. B proceeds as the real oracle.
Output. Finally, the adversary A is supposed to output a forgery (ID * , v * , τ * , Q * ) such that Q * = (w * , σ * 1 , σ * 2 , s * ) and Hverify(ID * , v * , τ * , Q * ) = 1. According to the definition of Type 1 forgery, the file identifier τ * = τ j for all τ j that appears in any Reveal queries and the identity ID * does not appear in HExtract queries. So B can output ((τ * , w * ), σ *
) as a forgery for S.
Let us analyze B's probability of success. It is straightforward to see that if the adversary has advantage in forging the signature scheme, then B has probability at least /2 in breaking the security of S.
B. TYPE 2 SIMULATION
Assuming B is a simulator and A is an adversary, B is given (g, g x , g y ) in order to output g xy .
In this case, B has guessed that A will return a Type 2 forgery. We describe B that uses A to break the CDH assumption. First, B runs (x s , P pub s ) ← Setup(1 λ ) as the secret/public key of PKG for S, sets P pub ← g x , and initializes an empty 
to the H 1 −List (Note that * means the corresponding value is unknown).
H 2 −queries. Assuming A makes H 2 −queries at most q H 2 times, B randomly chooses α j , β j ∈ Z * q . When A queries to
HExtract queries. When A requests secret key for user ID k , assuming w.l.o.g A has requested H 1 −queries on ID k , B checks the H 1 −List and computes D from L. Then choose s ∈ Z * q randomly, and compute
So the signature is Q = (w, σ 1 , σ 2 , s). It is easy to check that Q is valid. Note that Q is associated with a new handle h and stored (h, (Q, ID k , v, τ ) corresponding (r, w, σ 1 ) from L. Then compute
So the signature is Q = (w, σ 1 , σ 2 , s). It is not hard to see that the signature Q is correct. Because
Hence we have
Then Q is associated with a new handle h and B stores (h, (Q, ID η , v, τ )) in T . Finally, the signature Q is not directly returned to A but associated with a new handle h.
Output. Finally, the adversary A is supposed to output a forgery (
= ID η with the probability
, then it proceeds as follows. Given the file identifier τ * , B gets the corresponding (r, w) from the table L. Note that Q * = (w * , σ * 1 , σ * 2 , s * ) is a Type 2 forgery, so w * = w = g rx (Otherwise, if w * = w, then ((τ * , w * ), σ * 1 ) is a forgery for S). And (σ * 2 , s * ) can satisfy the second verification equation
Assuming w.l.o.g A has requested H 1 −queries on ID η and H 2 −queries on τ * , B checks H 1 −List, and gets
So by the non-degenerate property, we have
Then the CDH problem is solved. Now we only need to show that
q . We use a technique analysis similar to that in the analysis of [25] . According to the above assumption, we know that A only queries the HSigning oracle on independent vectors for each file identifier τ . Since all of the signed message vectors are N −dimensional vectors, we assume w.l.o.g. that A makes at most N − 1 HSigning queries for the file identifier τ * (Otherwise, the signed message vectors
} for file identifier τ * will compose a maximal linear independent group. So B can simulate HSigning queries for itself). Assume that A makes exactly N −1 Reveal queries with the file τ * and gets Q i = (w (i) , σ This completes the proof.
V. APPLICATION IN DATA ANALYSIS AND BLOCKCHAIN
Recently, blockchain has attracted more and more attention from both academy and industry because of its decentralization. The blockchain has been widely applied in the smart contract and financial transactions, and data forensics in IoT as well. In this section, we will show how to use the homomorphic signature scheme in the construction in the IoT for the data and computation authentication. With the advent of blockchain, more and more users are using the blockchain to store their personal data in blockchain as an access control service because of the properties of unforgettability in the blockchain. When the volume of data grows, the data utilization will be valuable for data analysis. As we know, big data transactions have been common for the promotion of data service. However, with the utilization of the thirdparty service provider such as cloud computing, the big data computation such as data mining and machine learning over the data can be performed at the third-party's side. As a result, the user can get the result from the cloud server while relieving the computation overhead. Though the advantages of the cloud computing techniques, another issue arises, that is, how to achieve the characteristic of authentication of the original data and the results. In more details, if the cloud server return a wrong computation result that is not computed from the user's data, it will be difficult for the receiver to detect.
To overcome this challenge, we show how to use the homomorphic signature to achieve the data authentication and guarantee the correctness of the computation results.
At first, the users involved in our system generate their own public keys for the blockchain system, that is, the virtual identity for our homomorphic signature. To upload the data in the cloud or distributed storage nodes while providing the outsourced computation service, the user first generates the signature for all the data stored in the nodes. Then, the data and the signature will be uploaded to the storage nodes in the network. Furthermore, the pointer to the data, including the access information will be computed and stored in the blockchain. To access the data, the users first access and get the pointer from the blockchain. If they are allowed to access the data, they can further download and compute the data. To reduce the communication and computation overhead, the users may ask the nodes to compute the data with any function they provide. The reason is that all the data are signed with homomorphic signature and any function can be compute with this type of signature.
After the computation, the users will be able to get the computation results as well as the aggregate homomorphic signature for this computation results. After that, the users are able to verify the computation results with the virtual identity. If the signature is valid, the users accept the computation result from the nodes. Otherwise, it means that the computation results are invalid. With the blockchain techniques, it also guarantees that the data owner or service provides such as the nodes can get a fair payment after they provide the data or computation.
The security of the above scheme can be easily analyzed with the property of blockchain and homomorphic signature. With the technique of blockchain, any user, including the data owner and the nodes cannot change the data information and their digital signature. Furthermore, the fairness can be guaranteed with the blockchain without a centralized party. With the technique of the homomorphic signature, data computation can be performed while keeping the authentication. The results from the nodes can be verified by checking the signature.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first formally introduce the concept and security model of ID-based linearly homomorphic signature, then design a new ID-based linearly homomorphic signature scheme. The scheme allows a signer to produce linearly homomorphic signature and avoids the shortcomings of the use of public-key certificates. Moreover, the scheme is proved secure against existential forgery on adaptively chosen message and ID attack under the random oracle model. ID-based linearly homomorphic signature schemes can be applied in e-business, cloud computing and blockchain. 
